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This paper explores the disorganised political order (‘pirarchy’) generated 
by so-called digital pirates, arguing that pirarchy appears in swarms. 
Swarms are not necessarily revolutionary, but they can be disruptive. 
They are a social formation, growing out of reaction to, and enabled with-
in, the systems of information capitalism, which do not form a harmoni-
ous, self-reinforcing whole. 
We examine ‘swarms’ of pirarchy responding to the legal attack on the 
Demonoid BitTorrent tracker, and the court cases around the Sony 
PlayStation 3. In the Demonoid example, the imposition of legal order 
through internationally coordinated server raids, shutdowns, and arrests, 
temporarily disordered the affective ties and sense of social obligation 
around the site, sending exchange elsewhere. Swarms flux, appearing 
both fragile and robust. In the Sony case, even with the coordination of 
corporate and juridical systems, the incoherent and uncoordinated pi-
rarchs significantly disrupted Sony’s capability, even though ultimately 
the situation may have continued as normal. Disorder was restored as 
much as order. We analyse these events using anarchist theory about the 
relations between theft and property, the repressions arising from work 
and the cultural necessity for play. Freedom of exchange is required for 
cultural creativity and is challenged by the total orders of capitalism and 
wage labour.  
Resisting Neoliberalism, Resisting Enclosure 
Neoliberalism represents the attempted hyper-capitalist/corporate takeo-
ver of the State. It enforces markets for all, with governmental support 
primarily remaining for those successful in such markets and able to buy 
or influence State representation (Subcomandante Marcos 2002: 107-115; 
Harvey 2005). As increasing numbers of people directly experience the 
psychological, social and economic impacts of privatisation, dispossession, 
and destruction of freedoms under neoliberalism, they sporadically take 
to the streets in a spontaneously collective and largely uncoordinated ‘Ya 
basta!’ (Enough is enough!). Such events perhaps mark a protest against 
turning affects, relational and linguistic skills, and social connections into 
wage-work; a collective refusal of ‘work time and life time [...] effectively 
becoming indistinguishable’ (Tiqqun 2011: 19). Simultaneously, millions 
of people worldwide enter online circuits of free exchange defying the ap-
propriation and commodification of culture.  
The success of neoliberalism with its ‘free-market’ austerity measures, ap-
plying to all but the wealthy, generates a social discipline in which noth-
ing, not ‘nature’, nor childcare, nor emotions, nor linguistic capacity, nor 
personal photographs, are to be left unenclosed as commodities (Virno 
2004: 56, 59; Arvanitakis 2007). This links to earlier forms of dispossession 
and enclosure. The proletariat’s genesis in Europe and America demanded 
‘enclosure’ of not only communal land but also of social relations’ 
(Federici 2004: 9). In sixteenth-century England, a systematic process of 
enclosures paved the way for the ‘proletarianization of the common peo-
ple, subjecting them to multifaceted labour discipline’ (Linebaugh 2008: 
51). Enclosure destroyed livelihoods dependent on commoners’ practices, 
and stripped people of traditionally shared socio-cultural freedoms and 
leisure. Alongside this destruction came ‘the elimination of cakes and ale, 
the elimination of sports, the shunning of dance, the abolition of festivals, 
and the strict discipline over the male and female bodies’ to the extent 
that the ‘land and the body lost their magics’ and aliveness (ibid: 51-5). 
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The growth of capitalism was, and remains, hostile to non-
commercialised or non-commodified enjoyment and liberty. Contempo-
rary enclosures (and extensions of enclosures) of cultural commons like-
wise act as an attack on leisure, freedom, joy and non-commercial self-
expression in the name of profit and production.  
In the sixteenth century, many engaged in ‘armed rebellion for the 
preservation of their material commons’ (Linebaugh 2008: 53). Tens of 
thousands of rebels set up ‘planned and coordinated’ campsites in the 
English lowlands demanding the end to Enclosures and, albeit implicitly, 
a return to a more empowered commons-based sufficiency, and existence 
in which culture (joy, magic, cakes, ale and dancing) had its times and 
places (ibid: 54). They were clearly unsuccessful. As industrialisation took 
root in the early nineteenth century, loosely organised groupings whose 
members were later identified as Luddites protested against discipline by 
machines, and the disruption of self-directed labour, craft-skills, leisure 
and culture. The State responded with troops, upholding new Combina-
tion and Conspiracy Acts which criminalised communication and associa-
tion amongst workers (Sale 1995).  
 
Swarms of Pirarchy 
Today, peer-to-peer (P2P) file exchange, or ‘digital piracy’, mounts a simi-
lar resistance, targeting the kinds of cultural enclosure and commodifica-
tion informational capitalism depends on to sustain and expand its order-
ing regimes. As Adrian John (2009) points out, piracy of intellectual 
property has a long history, usually focused on competition and success 
in markets, claiming others’ work as one’s own, or espionage/warfare be-
tween States. However, contemporary piracy of the kind we are discussing 
does not usually involve selling ‘stolen’ goods for profit, or State vs State 
conflict; it involves relatively free exchange between non-commercial ac-
tors. In particular, contemporary piracy subverts the technological, legal, 
and social locks and exclusions around the popular narrative forms of to-
day, which form part of our cultural conversations: the song, the film, the 
television programme, the book, and the computer game. File-exchangers 
are not necessarily definite or organised revolutionaries, or challenging 
the institutions of property themselves, but their practices emphasise the 
incoherencies of capitalist property and commodity (Marshall & da Rimi-
ni 2015). They challenge the orthodox regimes of distribution and the ‘dis-
tribution industries’, which Cubitt (2006) describes, that help turn culture 
into a restricted commodity. These ‘unauthorised’ practices, perhaps un-
intentionally, generate some new cultural challenges, political formations 
and actors, which we label ‘pirarchy’ and ‘pirarchs’ respectively. It may 
well be important to ‘create new circuits, new economies alongside the 
new technologies and techniques that are such a hallmark of the con-
temporary mediascape’ (ibid: 209).  
Pirarchs consider their exchange practices as mundane, unremarkable or 
even boring, and the gulf between social norms and capitalist State-based 
legal norms becomes increasingly apparent (da Rimini & Marshall 2014). 
However, this proto-movement can only happen because people are pre-
pared (however subliminally) to risk their personal liberty, financial re-
sources and social reputation to reclaim what their actions imply rightful-
ly belongs to them. 
Pirarchs move in culturally diverse and ideologically uncoordinated 
‘swarms’ with only accidental unity; their actions have implications rather 
than direction. There is no necessity to posit a unity or a conscious ‘swarm 
intelligence’, but simply a social effect. These swarms build particular hab-
its and attitudes, but they are not the only active swarms around, and 
people move (often silently) from one to another, perhaps even without 
realising. Swarms don’t have stability, they exploit fragmentation. Hack-
tivist researcher Tatiana Bazzichelli (2013: 138) claims participants in 
Anonymous actions (who generally support pirarchs), ‘pop up in pursuit 
of the most diverse of causes, or not following any of them, just for fun, 
or for the lulz [laughs]’. The fundamental characteristic of Anonymous is 
that it is ‘not one, but many [...] not a group or a network, but a swarm, or 
to be correct, multiple swarms that feed off each other’, as Felix Stalder 
says (2012). Stalder claims that Anonymous is a self-consciously leaderless 
organization. But it appears that ad hoc leaders arise, especially those with 
specific technical or rhetorical skills, as with the press and video releases. 
Christopher Kelty (in Coleman 2014: 100) points to the ‘superaltern’; the 
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cadre of ‘highly educated geeks’ prominent in the free software move-
ment, as such ad hoc leaders, although as we shall see this leadership is 
not always welcome or able to exert formal control. 
The term ‘swarms’ may have implications of over-ordering for the social 
formations we are discussing. Swarms arise in networks of communica-
tion and response, traditionally in off-line places, fading before repression 
as with the Luddites. On-line, the networks of communication are ever 
ready to be taken up. Unlike insect swarms or bird flocks, on-line swarms 
are not necessarily genetically, ideologically or purposefully related, they 
don't last for long periods of time, and membership may change continu-
ally and rapidly. Swarm participants do not necessarily have a sustained 
sense of belonging, although they may. The swarm has the potential to be 
both ‘localised’ and distributed at the same time. As Eugene Thacker re-
marks, this is not unusual: ‘Organisms are never just individuals, and nev-
er just groups; the ‘behaviour’ of an organism is at the intersection of in-
dividual, group, and environment [...] the locale of agency is never clear-
cut’ (Thacker 2004b). However, there is a tendency for analysts to find too 
much order to justify their interests in swarms. For example, Vehlken 
writes ‘the collective as a whole is able to adapt nearly flawlessly to the 
changing conditions of its surroundings’ (2103: 111). ‘Nearly flawlessly’ is 
an over-claim. The swarm may function well enough for most practical 
purposes, or may undermine itself, or be dislocating for participants. The 
power of the swarm depends on contingent decisions; people drop out or 
accumulate. Swarming techniques ‘can be applied wherever there are ‘dis-
turbed conditions’, wherever imprecisely defined problems present them-
selves, wherever system parameters are constantly in flux, and wherever 
solution strategies become blindingly complex’ (ibid: 111). Again this 
could be over-ordering by implication. Swarms may not give the ‘right’ 
solutions, and may disrupt some participants’ aims. The analytic im-
portance of swarms is that they focus our attention on unintentional ef-
fects; the effect of the swarm may not be intended (or anticipated) by any, 
or many, members. In this sense swarms could be revolutionary in their 
effects, without constituting a self-conscious party or vanguard of revolu-
tion; their action does not necessarily resolve into a new established order; 
it can be an indication of ongoing unresolvable disorder, or flux. 
While swarms may be radical and transformative, they can also be ‘reac-
tionary’, self-disruptive, or destructive. ‘The fact that a movement is or-
ganized as a network or swarm does not guarantee that it is peaceful or 
democratic’ (Hardt & Negri 2005: 93). Swarms can also result from capital-
ist attempts at control as with viral marketing, or through top-down gen-
eration of swarms of ‘flexibilised’ workers. Boltanski and Chiapello suggest 
that the temporary order around ‘projects’, is at the heart of mainstream 
work in contemporary capitalism (2005: 168), while mobile communica-
tion means that workers are constantly available for swarmed work; the 
networks of communication and organisation work both ways to produce 
order and disorder. 
Similarly, swarms of pirates and hackers can be useful to capitalists as 
pointing to markets, maintaining conversations which promote sales, 
driving technical and organisational innovation, and some ISPs allegedly 
profit from providing services which enable pirarchy (Marshall et al forth-
coming; da Rimini 2013: 320). Pirarchs are still likely to be dependent on 
wage labour (or State welfare regimes) and the products of wage labour, as 
they cannot survive on free exchange. As Thacker states: ‘mutations in 
the contemporary body politic [are] structurally innovative, but politically 
ambivalent’ (2004a). We suggest pirarchical swarms eventuate around am-
biguous relations to, and problems about, ‘cultural property’. They grow 
out of networked informational capitalism, and can both promote infor-
mational capitalism and attempt to reclaim aspects of life which are dis-
rupted by that form of capitalism. Indeed, many of the justifications for 
their pirarchical practices that file-exchangers express on leading copy-
right and file-sharing news site TorrentFreak (2015) appear to be a desire 
for a ‘better’ capitalism (in the form of fairly-priced goods in open for-
mats) rather than an end to capitalism per se. As we shall see pirarchs do 
not necessarily posit the end of property, but rather the desire to have 
their rights to exchange, use and modify their own property unobstructed 
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Anarchism: property, co-operation and play 
Anarchism has, at least since the time of French anarchist Pierre-Joseph 
Proudhon (1809-65), argued that forms of property and labour are inti-
mately tied to oppression and/or liberty, and that contemporary ar-
rangements favour oppression. Anarchists highlight the inherently coop-
erative social processes underlying the production of knowledge and 
culture, arguing that these material expressions of human thought and 
invention are made in common and must be held in common, or social 
creativity and freedom will die. This theory not only gives us a framework 
to think about the spontaneous pirarchy emerging in on-line peer-to-peer 
swarms and exchange, but also merges with pirarchical actions.  
Anarchists and some socialists argue there is no coherent justification for 
private property of the kind praised in capitalism: that is, property which 
is alienable, disposable at will, and belongs only to one person (or corpora-
tion) with the right to prevent others accessing it. Exclusion and appro-
priation is the hallmark of this kind of property. As the English artist and 
socialist William Morris (1834-1896) stated, under capitalism, property is 
conceived as ‘something which you can prevent other people from using’ 
(Morris 1886). Traditionally, defences of capitalist property depend on a 
refusal to acknowledge property’s collective origins in nature (the world), 
in collective labour and in collective ideas, building a rupture to justify 
exclusion and profit. This rupture is built by force, law and threat. 
In reality, all property depends on labour, which depends on collabora-
tion with others, and upon technology developed and built by others. ‘No 
one can say that he produces alone. The blacksmith, the tailor, the cob-
bler, etc., etc., cooperate with the cultivator in plowing the earth, just as 
the cultivator cooperates in the manufacture of their products’ (Prou-
dhon nd). Ideas and art likewise depend on access to previous ideas and 
discourse. ‘There is not even a thought, or an invention, which is not 
common property, born of the past and the present’ (Kropotkin 1906: 7). 
We borrow, exchange, and cooperate constantly, whether for spontane-
ous play or purposeful endeavour. This is vital to human lives.  
 
In anarchist theory, the boundaries around property in its capitalist sense 
are enforced by business, the State, by laws and by violence; by ‘legiti-
mised’ robbery, extortion and exploitation. Legitimacy comes from domi-
nance, not from ‘justice’ or any principle other than power. Capitalists are 
rarely prosecuted for destroying land in mining or development, or for 
taking from the commons, but the State does prosecute those who try to 
reclaim what the capitalist removes or destroys. Property is theft, as Prou-
dhon famously declared, because it is enclosed from, or taken from, the 
labour of all. Similarly, theft cannot exist without the existence of proper-
ty and exclusion. French Anarchist Élisée Reclus (1830-1905) argued that 
‘we are all, without exception, forced by the conditions of existence into a 
life of outright theft’ (Reclus 2013: 60). He suggested that as capitalism is 
built on theft, so property should be stolen back (Fleming 1988: 142). Re-
clus recognised there is ambiguity because it is possible for thieves to aspire 
to be bourgeois and keep the property for themselves or use it to lord it 
over others. So the political virtue of theft may depend on motives (ibid: 
150). The legitimacy of ‘taking back’ is a source of dispute and contention 
amongst anarchists (ibid: 143-52). Anarchism emphasises the ambiguities 
of property as force, property as theft, and theft as activism, which are 
central to pirarchy. 
Most anarchists recognise that the capitalist property system forces people 
into wage labour, and to find a master/employer. In general the products 
of people’s labour, time and life are ‘paid for’ in a form of unequal ex-
change, with power relations determining the rewards of work. Would 
people really continue their work, if they were guaranteed a liveable pros-
perity free of it? As Bob Black (1991: np) suggests: ‘In order to stop suffer-
ing, we have to stop working. That doesn’t mean we have to stop doing 
things. It does mean creating a new way of life based on play; in other 
words, a ludic revolution. By ‘play’ I mean also festivity, creativity, conviv-
iality, commensality, and maybe even art’. 
As in the origins of capitalism, free play is suppressed to meet the demands 
of consumption and wage labour. In contemporary wage labour systems, 
workers have to postpone ‘rest and leisure’ to the distant future, be availa-
ble and amenable at all times. Their time is commodified and neoliberal-
ism reinforces ideas that unemployed freedom should be punished. Re-
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volt grows from a desire for a more human reality of ludic expression 
(which exists however precariously in capitalism), of intrinsic reward and 
free exchange. To quote Black again: ‘Playing and giving are closely relat-
ed, they are the behavioral and transactional facets of the same impulse, 
the play-instinct. They share an aristocratic disdain for results. The player 
gets something out of playing; that’s why he plays’ (ibid.). 
Echoes of Black’s ‘ludic revolution’ resonate in the writings of those 
French anarchists who, as The Invisible Committee, published 
L’insurrection qui vient (The Coming Insurrection). They argue that un-
der capitalism, ‘becoming independent’ means finding a boss (The Invisi-
ble Committee 2009: 41), that the ‘horror of work is less a part of work 
itself than of the methodical devastation, over centuries, of everything 
that is not [work]’ (ibid: 38), including: the familiarities of one’s neigh-
bourhood and trade, of kinship, our attachment to places, to beings, to 
the seasons, to ways of doing and speaking. To survive the horror we must 
reject the demands of (neoliberal) flexibility and mobility, and instead ‘or-
ganize beyond and against work, to collectively desert the regime of mo-
bility, to demonstrate the existence of a vitality and a discipline precisely 
in demobilization’ (ibid: 51, emphasis in original). That is, refuse to be mo-
bilised to work. In the village of Tarnac these anarchists ‘planted carrots 
without bosses or leaders. Because they naively think that life, intelligence 
and decisions are more joyous when they are collective’ (the parents of 
Bertrand et al 2008). The State suppressed them, as if there was something 
inherently subversive in collective happiness outside of the capitalist grid 
of consumer behaviours.  
When capitalist hierarchy requires labour to be always available, the ludic 
Self retaliates, by being prepared and technologically able to satisfy multi-
ple desires for play, entertainment, relaxation, stimulation, creation and 
distraction. These desires are not external to capitalism, and may be gen-
erated by capitalism as an engine of consumption (da Rimini & Marshall 
2014: 326-7). We are not arguing that pirarchy is external to capitalism, but 
that it challenges it. Similarly, the tools enabling computer labour and 
exclusion also allow people to subvert, copy and distribute its results easi-
ly, in pirarchical subversion, production and exchange. We shall now pro-
ceed to show how these anarchist theories elucidate events in the con-
temporary world by looking at the attack on the Demonoid tracker site, 
and a fight against Sony.  
 
Commercial Repression of the Demons 
Demonoid is part of the ‘digital piracy’ ecosystem. Like its more infamous 
cousin The Pirate Bay it is a kind of specialist search engine that helps peo-
ple find digitised goods they want to download, regardless of whether or 
not these goods originally were enclosed by copyright restrictions or 
technological barriers. Specifically, Demonoid is a semi-private peer-to-
peer (P2P) ‘tracker’ site using the BitTorrent internet communications 
protocol to facilitate file exchange. Participants often proclaim it to be a 
community. Launched in 2003, it hosts an on-line searchable index of 
links to Internet Protocol (IP) addresses of digital devices holding copies, 
or partial copies, of media files (films, music tracks, e-books, etc) catego-
rised by genre and sub-genre. Users click on a link to enter a file-sharing 
‘swarm’ for a specific item.  
A swarm is comprised of ‘seeders’ (peers who have a completed copy of 
the media file and continue to ‘seed’ it back), and ‘downloaders’ (peers 
who are downloading the file in segments) (da Rimini 2013: 315-6). The 
BitTorrent protocol enforces technological cooperation (sharing via up-
loading) during downloading, although people have no obligation to fur-
ther seed a file after completing a download. The term ‘swarm’ in the file-
sharing context probably originated with the Swarmcast P2P content dis-
tribution system, released in 2001, just prior to the development of the 
BitTorrent P2P protocol (Koman 2001).  
Demonoid members frequently report the sense of ‘camaraderie’ arising 
from belonging to a community passionate about ‘many niche subjects’. 
One described Demonoid as being inhabited by ‘small groups of people 
sharing content they all loved’ (comment on Andy 8 May 2013). For 
‘Carl’, an interviewee in our research project investigating Australian art-
ists’ and cultural producers’ social norms around file-sharing (da Rimini 
& Marshall 2014), the ‘giant Alexandrian library’ is propelling an ideologi-
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cal shift: ‘Generosity is really one of the most radical concepts that you 
could dream up and being generous with bandwidth and with content 
and ideas’ (‘Carl’ interview). Another artist and Demonoid member was 
‘fascinated’ by how file-sharing had ‘changed the ownership of infor-
mation and the ownership of immaterial things...and how that’s changed 
the whole landscape of exchange between people’ (‘Ti’ interview).  
The sharing on Demonoid not only involved commercially available 
items, but items of purely local interest, self-produced items, and general-
ly unavailable material. In that sense, file-sharing sites can rescue cultural 
works from obscurity, making the hard to get ‘gettable’, and revitalising 
culture in the process as people engage with new (often ‘old’) works. One 
interviewee felt obliged to share obscure items from his extensive archive 
of (purchased) films and vinyl albums because the on-line community 
would not be able to get them elsewhere (da Rimini & Marshall 2014). 
Furthermore, creative artists can access new concepts, artistic trends and 
material elements to play with, remix and upload. ‘Everything I watch 
actually goes into something I write really’ (‘Mel’ interview). ‘Theft’ is, in 
these cases, opening. Pirarchy, explicitly and practically, emphasises the 
sharing aspect of culture, and cultural production, described by anar-
chists, and suggest new paradigms, even if it does not resolve problems of 
survival. 
It seems that many pirarchs are ‘incidental activists’. If an activist is ‘some-
one who takes part in activities that are intended to achieve political or 
social change’ (MacMillan Dictionary, nd), then an ‘incidental activist’ is 
someone who can be apolitical, but ‘accidentally’ contributes to social and 
cultural change by their presence and activities. Torrenting is ‘becoming 
so mainstream it’s not so much community but just society’ (‘EKA’ inter-
view). Nevertheless EKA’s attitude implies culture should be non-
commodified. Others are aware of swarms’ social and political potential. 
‘It’s a very visual kind of metaphor, that idea of the swarming and the 
seeding and it’s egalitarian… It’s not just people leeching off the products 
of capitalism – it’s also people who are creating and distributing, produc-
ing and distributing stuff from scratch totally outside of all available sys-
tems’ (‘Toxic honey’ interview). 
As these alternative practices proliferate and become normalised, they 
further threaten existing ordering regimes. Just as the State sought to 
suppress those struggling to reclaim the commons, so too neoliberal pow-
er attempts to contain, constrain and punish those prising open informa-
tional flows to build a digital commons. In terms of repression of pirarchy 
as spectacle, we need look no further than the 2009 trial of The Pirate Bay 
founders (Ӧzdemirci 2014), and the 2012 arrest and requested extradition 
of New Zealand-based Megaupload cyberlocker founder/owner Kim Dot-
com involving simultaneous multi-country raids (Palmer & Warren 2013). 
The less dramatic Demonoid raid in 2012 also involved a determined effort 
by what, following Critical Art Ensemble (1994: 11-30), we call the ‘no-
madic power’ of authority.  
Anticipating attack, Demonoid also became nomadic, tactically changing 
its TLD (Top Level Domain) to thwart US authorities’ ability to terminate 
its domain-name registration, and shifting its server from Canada to 
Ukraine. Neverthess, in August 2012 a swarm of power flowing through 
INTERPOL, the Ukrainian police, the Mexican Attorney General, the In-
ternational Federation of the Phonographic Industry, and the US gov-
ernment, launched a joint criminal investigation, resulting in the site’s 
shutdown, a reported arrest in Mexico, and assets seizures (Jacob 2012; 
Ernesto 2013). Property rights were asserted by acts of power and threat. 
This act against a much-loved platform generated a swarmed retaliation 
response, with Anonymous launching an electronic disturbance called 
‘OpDemonoid’. Cultural anthropologist Gabriella Coleman describes 
Anonymous as: ‘part digital direct action, part human rights technology 
activism, and part performance spectacle, [that] while quite organization-
ally flexible, is perhaps one of the most extensive movements to have aris-
en almost directly from certain quarters of the Internet’ (2012: 210). This 
movement of ‘hackers, pranksters, and activists’ is anarchic, and both se-
riously ludic and deadly serious. Each operation announces ‘Game on!’ to 
the targeted opponents and those interested in participating. In this case, 
OpDemonoid participants launched Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
attacks, crashing three Ukrainian websites (BBC 2012). A video clip enti-
tled OP Demonoid will not be televised exhorted supporters to replicate 
the clip through their social networks (Anonymous 2012). Pirarchy is a 
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Hydra, as Anonymous warned: ‘where one has fallen, many will rise to 
take their place….For most of us Demonoid and other public trackers 
have been about much more than music or movies. They are an incredi-
bly powerful educational tool, facilitating much more than just open pi-
racy[...] [they] provide a model for distribution… Corporations and gov-
ernments fear them. Anonymous will not tolerate a world without them’ 
(Ragan 2012).  
After some false starts, a resurrected Demonoid made a ‘glorious come-
back’ in March 2014 (Ernesto 2014a). However, the site felt different to 
some. ‘It feels like walking into your old childhood home. The memories 
are there, but other folks live there now’ (comment on Andy 2013). Some 
jumped to alternative sites, believing that Demonoid ‘should just stay 
dead... Our community was at a loss that day, but it’s time to look towards 
the future of other public and private trackers’ (fratdaddyZC 2013).  
Whilst on-line swarms escape easy documentation, a similar sentiment ‘to 
move on’ was expressed by some users of The Pirate Bay (TPB), following 
its shutdown by Swedish authorities in December 2014. Even TPB co-
founder Peter Sunde predicted that a better platform, one with more soul 
and ‘no ads for porn and Viagra’, would emerge out of the ‘immense void’ 
TPB’s demise left (Ernesto 2014b). Indeed, within a fortnight open-source 
activists had released TPB’s source code to the global torrent community 
via GitHub to enable ‘individuals with minimal IT skills, and basic server 
equipment to create a Pirate Bay clone on their own domain’ (‘iso-
huntto/openbay’ 2014), perhaps even generating a shifting swarm of Pirate 
Bays.  
With Demonoid, it appears that the swarms around its files and forums 
may be rebuilding. A Demonoid forum moderator reports that there ‘are 
[still] somewhere upwards of 9 million registered accounts’ (schatuk 2014). 
Domain statistics for 30 December 2014 identify 308,586 daily visitors and 
2,468,688 page views (demonoid.ph Domain Analysis 2014). It is hard to be 
precise. As Vehlken states ‘swarms are problematic objects of knowledge: 
they disrupt the scientific processes of objectification’ (2013: 112). Howev-
er, these anarchic and ludic swarms, while growing out of communicative 
capitalism, seem to be difficult for that capitalism to completely suppress, 
or ignore, especially when those capitalists try to enforce or extend their 
own property rights into what was seen as commons, or as cultural au-
tonomy.  
 
Swarms versus Sony  
The law cases and actions around the Sony PlayStation3 (PS3) reinforce 
these points. Sony was perceived to be extending its copyright and proper-
ty claims over people’s gaming machines, disrupting owner’s previous 
capacities or usage (‘thieving’) to an unprecedented extent, and was faced 
by mass protests, attempting to steal back the ‘property space’, in favour 
of play and personal usage. Since 2000 Sony promoted its PlayStation 
hardware as able to run computer software and non-inbuilt operating 
systems (the Other O/S option). The PlayStation up to the PlayStation 3 
(PS3) was a computer as well as a games machine, and reputedly secure. 
In December 2009, George Hotz, a hacker who gained fame by freeing the 
iPhone from compulsory attachment to the AT&T network, was given a 
PS3 along with a challenge. Just over a month later he announced that he 
had opened the processor and memory to programming (NZHawk nd). 
Fearing that this would allow piracy, Sony issued an ‘upgrade’ in March 
2010, which destroyed the machine’s ability to run other operating sys-
tems, and if not installed meant loss of the PlayStation network, playback 
of games, access to new games, and ability to play Blu-ray movies etc 
(Reisinger 2010). Next month a class action court case was initiated assert-
ing that Sony had deprived people of functions of the property they 
owned. 
In December 2010 the hacker group fail0verflow, protesting the compul-
sory removal of the Other O/S option, demonstrated they had a way to 
get around the block. One member asserted their rights to personal and 
cultural property, stating: ‘I haven’t stolen anything… It’s my own hard-
ware, I can run whatever I like on it’ (Fildes 2011). Shortly afterwards Hotz 
released an encryption key, which allowed people to sign whatever soft-
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ware they liked and have the PS3 run it. Hotz’s code supposedly disabled 
the ability to run pirated software (Kushner 2012). Sony then launched a 
court case in California against Hotz and one hundred unspecified John 
Does (thus potentially generating their own imagined and potentially 
compelled swarms), alleging the defendants were bypassing ‘effective 
technological protective measures’ and violating ‘the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act and the Computer Fraud Abuse Act’ (Reisinger 2011). Sony 
argued that California should have jurisdiction, despite Hotz residing on 
the other side of the US in New Jersey, because Hotz had a PayPal account, 
and used Twitter and YouTube. The judge was disturbed by this, saying 
that ‘would mean the entire universe is subject to my jurisdiction, and 
that’s a really hard concept for me to accept’. Hotz would clearly be dis-
advantaged by such proceedings. 
Rather incoherently, the judge eventually allowed Sony to sue in Califor-
nia, claiming that Hotz’s website was aimed at California. However, his 
website was aimed at anyone who spoke English, there was no specific 
mention of California; so this ruling potentially made anyone with a web-
site subject to the judge’s jurisdiction. Sony was also allowed to obtain the 
IP addresses of people who visited Hotz’s website. These rulings extended 
Sony’s legal power. The case also extended definitions of intellectual 
property, increasing enclosure or legitimating corporate theft. George 
Washington University Professor of Law, Orin Kerr, wrote (2011) ‘this is 
the first case I know of claiming that you can commit an unauthorized 
access of your own computer’. The Electronic Frontier Foundation also 
protested that Sony claimed rights which prevented people ‘tinkering 
with’ their own property (Kushner 2012). Even established property 
boundaries are vague and depend on power contests, and can potentially 
be appropriated at any time. 
As with the legal attacks on Demonoid, these extensions of property and 
power attracted the attention of Anonymous swarms who began attack-
ing Sony’s internet sites. Some members of the hacker swarm stated their 
objections in press releases, pointing out as that Sony attacked people’s 
property rights because they did not like people’s actions, so now Anon-
ymous was similarly violating Sony’s property (Tangled Web 2011). Again 
the ambiguities of property are central.  
A DDoS attack caused the PlayStation network to crash repeatedly, alt-
hough Sony denied Anonymous were responsible (Tangled Web 2011). 
Lack of certainty can be tactically useful to both sides. Anonymous soon 
abandoned the attack after angering gamers who had paid to play and 
who are important legitimisers of its actions (Olson 2012: 227-8).  
Soon after, Sony settled with Hotz, requiring him to promise that he 
would never hack any other Sony product without facing stiff penalties 
(Groklaw 2011). A week later Sony revealed that the PlayStation net-
work’s problems were greater than previously announced, with 75 million 
people’s personal account details taken (Tangled Web 2011). Sony claimed 
before Congress it had evidence of a signature being left in its files showing 
Anonymous was behind the attack, but anyone can leave a text behind 
(Albanesius 2011). A possible Anonymous spokesperson pointed out that 
Sony’s claim allowed Sony ‘to shift attention away from its own failure to 
protect client data’ (Brown 2011). Blame is easy in this environment, how-
ever, there are obvious problems with distributed swarm action as it is al-
ways possible that some affiliated people will act in ways other ‘members’ 
do not like: ‘their leaderless, decentralized structure means that they are 
all essentially rogue elements’ (Tangled Web 2011). While there are sup-
posedly official announcements speaking on behalf of Anonymous, this is 
protest as dis-coordinated play; there is no one to make agreements with, 
or to hold back the fringes.  
Hotz seemed keen to distance himself and his kind of hacking from break-
ing into servers, saying: ‘You make the hacking community look bad, 
even if it is aimed at douches like Sony’ (Kushner 2012). While some 
Anonymous members may identify with Hotz as ‘superaltern’ (Olson 
2012: 227), the identification may not be reciprocated, or perhaps Hotz 
feared Sony would sue him again; this is not a politics of clarity. Swarms 
that form around Hotz and his case may not reference his desires or posi-
tions. However, various people did launch orthodox court cases against 
Sony for damages (BBC 2011). These (swarmed?) cases eventually resulted 
in a US$15 million settlement by Sony and fines in the UK for failure to 
keep its systems safe (Lien 2014). In this way play melds with the formal. 
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Anonymous swarms display a degree of playful and vindictive wit, and the 
hackers affiliated take actions because they can, because they enjoy it, be-
cause of the technical challenge, and to some extent for something to do. 
Alluding to the group’s ludic motivations and its ‘ongoing embrace of 
lulzy mischief’, where lulz are laughs at other people’s expense (perhaps 
expressing a sense of superiority as there is no necessity for swarm action 
to be egalitarian), Gabriella Coleman notes that ‘Lulz are unmistakably 
imbued with danger and mystery, and thus speak foremost to the pleas-
ures of transgression’ (2014: 33). Moreover, one of the principles that par-
ticipants adhere to is ‘a spirit of humorous deviance’ (ibid: 23). Anony-
mous’ play can be seen not only as a reclamation of ‘fun’ as politics, but a 
response to uncertain political problems, and the difficulties of formal 
action.  
Hotz, while clearly not afraid of boring repetitive work on his own behalf, 
also demonstrates this ludic sense of power and motivation. ‘I don’t hack 
because of some ideology [...] I hack because I’m bored’, and ‘I’m not a 
cause. I just like messing with shit’. He got bored with an internship at 
Google, and left Facebook wondering ‘how people stay employed for so 
long’ (Kushner 2012). Despite his negative reaction, this could show an 
ambiguous circulation between rebellion and co-operation. However, 
Hotz clearly reacts negatively to corporate power/exclusion being built 
into devices, wanting to allow people to own their equipment and use 
‘homebrew software’ as developed by anyone (The Loop 2011). ‘I don’t like 
when companies tell me what to do with products that I have purchased’ 
(Hotz 2012). 
While Hotz and fail0verflow both deny any piratical intentions, their rela-
tionship to intellectual property laws and extension of those laws is very 
similar. Along with Anonymous members and Demonoid users they do 
not want their particular culture to be locked away or restricted by corpo-
rate enclosures, copyright and lawsuits that reduce their play or capacity. 
They want to be able to construct and view software as culture, as much 
as others want to view films, books or games, to participate in conversa-
tion or make their own cultures.  
 
Conclusion 
Pirarchy emerges out of the convergence of the technological structure of 
communication networks, tools and social forms deployed by contempo-
rary capitalism. As such, pirarchy is not an outside alterity, but an internal 
disorder within capitalist orderings. The pirarchical swarm uses a general-
isable social formation with variable content and effects. That it can be 
seen as ambiguous, or as incidental activism, does not mean it can have no 
effect. Pirarchs expose and exploit informational capitalism’s inherent self-
disorderings and vulnerabilities, counterposing free exchange, cultural 
freedom, play and ludicity against neoliberalism’s demands for complete 
wage-labour dependency and total private ownership of culture and ideas. 
As such they illustrate anarchist concerns about the nature of property 
and the vital necessity of free exchange and co-operation for cultural vi-
tality and individual freedom, without needing any particular ideological 
unity. 
In keeping with this anarchistic tendency, rather than being unified or 
institutionalised, the swarm formations of pirarchy are disorderly, tempo-
rary, and contingent. They have no existence other than in the moment. 
Unlike swarms of insects, schools of fish, or flocks of birds, they have no 
kin or long-term relation. They appear and fade, as people log in and log 
out, plan ‘ops’ and campaigns via Internet Relay Chat channels, or form a 
swarm elsewhere. They build a force without a centre or formal organisa-
tion. Arrests or disappearances may not unsettle the swarm: the partici-
pants just go elsewhere and a new swarm appears. Swarms arise from, and 
are built into, the habits of exchange and receipt found throughout the 
internet and daily life. They can reclaim a non-commercial, non-work 
mode of living, based in cultural creativity, cultural demand, and enter-
tainment.  
The Demonoid story illustrates how control and liberation processes oc-
cur on a global level. As nomadic-neoliberal power flows across national 
borders, so does resistance. The growing participation in pirarchical pow-
er, from the mass of ludic subjects in P2P swarms to the masked bodies in 
street protests around the world against the US-driven and subsequently 
failed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, strongly suggests that the 
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fight to defend and extend the cultural and knowledge commons is gen-
erating new political actors, whether playful, politicised, or both. With 
Demonoid the internationally coordinated attacks temporarily destroyed 
the ‘community’ around the site, and it is unclear both how many people 
moved on for good and how many subsequently returned, and also 
whether ‘community’ even matters for swarm-life to have effect. Similar 
forces seem displayed in the swarmed protests that arose around Sony’s 
attempts to extend its legal and proprietorial rights. While there may have 
been figureheads, and while Sony clearly exploited the vagueness of net-
work society, the protests significantly changed the field, caused damage 
to Sony and were conducted in a ludic and uncontrolled manner, with 
potentially harmful effects for ‘innocent bystanders’. Swarm formations 
don’t have clear boundaries for attack, and they distribute risk and pro-
vide potential anonymity, and perceived safety, in numbers. Eventually it 
is hard to tell whether the situation was changed or not. Disorder was re-
stored as much as order, and the potential for continuing and commer-
cially damaging wars over property ‘rights’ was demonstrated. 
If there is to be a ludic revolution, or more realistically a ludic disruption, 
then it may tend to take a swarm form, by its nature. Ludicity resists or-
ganisation and discipline, which is both a weakness and a strength as it 
does not sacrifice its means to its ends, ends and means can harmonise. 
Such revolt is not normally sustained and thus ineffective when faced 
with organised opposition. However, in informational capitalism swarms 
become a normal, easily and instantaneously activated social formation 
and, while disorganised with unstable membership, can be continual in 
their effects. Disorder becomes the swarms’ strength. 
The classic argument Marxists make against anarchism is that anarchists 
can never organise to overthrow anything and fail at the last moment. 
Anarchists argue that Marxists institutionalise repression and never move 
beyond the State. Both have a point. Pirarchy forms and supports acci-
dental rebellion, while providing support for institutionalised moves. In 
its habits, it recognises that property always comes from a collective 
commons; the origin of all property is the natural world, cultural ideas, 
social labour, individual effort and contingency. In pirarchy people at-
tempt to rule themselves through informal exchange, conversation, col-
laboration and fragmentation. They resent attempts to stop the exchange. 
By taking back the cultural into their own lives, they challenge the ap-
propriation at the heart of capitalism using the tools and formations of 
capitalism, while capitalism, in turn, attempts to reappropriate and ex-
tend property claims. 
This is significant, as Reclus argued, because evolution and revolution are 
not alternate modes of social change, but rather are operating together. 
Evolution builds up pressures and preparation for change while the reso-
lutions to the pressures come in the shocks of revolution (Fleming 1988: 
123; Reclus 2013: 138). Pirarchy builds up habits which do not recognise 
some property types as exclusionary. If enough people act, and the habit 
becomes daily life, then the practices build up into a revolution of sorts. 
Historically, capitalism disrupts ludicity, and attempts to reclaim ludicity 
can be radical or disruptive of capital, even if accidentally. As Tiqqun ar-
gue, there ‘is in no way a necessity to “rise up”, but a necessity to raise, to 
refine, to spur our pleasure, to intensify our enjoyment’ (2011 p 167, em-
phasis in original), and out of this… who knows? 
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